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Abstract—When choices are made from ordered lists, individuals can
exhibit biases toward selecting certain options as a result of the ordering.
We examine this phenomenon in the context of consumer response to the
ordering of economics papers in an e-mail announcement issued by the
NBER. We show that despite the effectively random list placement, papers
listed first each week are about 30% more likely to be viewed, down-
loaded, and subsequently cited. We suggest that a model of ‘‘skimming’’
behavior, where individuals focus on the first few papers in the list due to
time constraints, would be most consistent with our findings.
I. Introduction
IN the canonical economic model, choices are made fromsets. However, as emphasized by Rubinstein and Salant
(2006), choices are often instead made from lists. This
appears to be increasingly true as individuals search for
information and goods online where choices are naturally
presented as a list. Consumers make fewer and fewer
choices in brick-and-mortar establishments where pairs of
goods are naturally compared, and instead turn to online
marketplaces where they are presented with a list of choices
from which to pick. Similarly, the practice of going through
physical libraries to browse through stacks of books and
journals arranged by topic has largely been replaced by
searching databases or the web with keywords, and typi-
cally selecting from a list of results.
The fact that individuals are choosing from a list raises
the distinct possibility that list ordering matters. In some set-
tings there may be a primacy effect, where individuals are
biased toward selecting items listed early, which can arise
because of cognitive fatigue, serial position effects on mem-
ory, or satisficing behavior when options are considered
similar and continued search is at all costly. Or, there may
be a recency effect biasing toward items later in the list due
to biased processing of earlier versus later information. Evi-
dence of order effects has been found in a variety of areas
ranging from multiple-choice testing, to elections, judging
contests, school admissions, asset trading, and pension fund
investments (see Miller & Krosnick, 1998; Jurajda &
Mu¨nich, 2010; Hartzmark, 2014; Danziger, Levav, &
Avnaim-Pesso, 2011; Karlsson, Massa, & Simonov, 2006).
In this paper, we investigate list ordering effects in a par-
ticularly interesting context: search for research papers. We
focus on measures of consumer response to the ordering of
economics papers in an e-mail announcement issued by the
NBER. The NBER disseminates cutting-edge economics
research through its working papers series. Each Monday
morning, the NBER issues a New This Week (NTW) e-mail
that lists all of the working papers that have been issued in
the past week. This e-mail goes to more than 23,000 sub-
scribers, both inside and outside academia. Papers are listed
based on the order in which they were received and pro-
cessed through the various filters that are required of
authors. Since the order of receipt and the extent of delay is
impossible to predict exante, this is a process that is essen-
tially impossible to game. Indeed, the employees responsi-
ble for constructing this e-mail view themselves as generat-
ing these lists randomly, and, as we document, paper
ranking in this e-mail is effectively random with respect to
most observable characteristics.
We build a database that matches each week’s NTW
ranking of papers with information on paper abstract views
(we refer to them as ‘‘hits’’), PDF downloads, and forward
citations. The first two are available over the 2013–2014
period, while for citations, we use the 2012–2013 period (to
allow citations to accrue).
Our findings are striking: despite the effectively random
allocation of papers to the NTW ranking, we find much
higher hits, downloads, and citations of papers presented
earlier in the list. The effects are particularly meaningful
for the first paper listed, with a 33% increase in views, a
29% increase in downloads, and a 27% increase in citations
from being listed first. For measures of downloads and hits,
although not for citations, there are further declines as
papers slide down the list. However, the last position is
associated with a boost in views and downloads. The results
are robust to a wide variety of specification checks and are
present for all subscribers, as well as those from academic
institutions. We also find some evidence that the effect of
being first is stronger when the list is longer but weaker dur-
ing the summer, when subscribers may be less busy.
We interpret our results in light of several potential models
of readership behavior, including satisficing behavior and ris-
ing marginal costs of reading due to cognitive fatigue or time
constraints. We suggest that a model of skimming, where
individuals focus on the first few papers in the list due to time
constraints, is most consistent with the empirical evidence.
This paper builds on prior research on order effects in
scientists’ citation behavior, such as Huang (2015) for
ordering in science journal reference lists based on the pri-
mary author’s surname initials; Haque and Ginsparg (2009)
for astrophysics and high energy physics papers dissemi-
nated on arXiv; and Berger (2016) for articles appearing
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earlier in a social psychology journal. But these papers suf-
fer from potential manipulation by authors or editors.1 Most
related to our work is a paper by Novarese and Wilson
(2013) that looks at order effects in research paper down-
loads (but not citations). They find that papers randomly
listed first in lists of new papers from Research Papers in
Economics (RePEc) receive more downloads and that the
effect is stronger when the lists are longer. However, the
interpretation of their results is complicated by the fact that
papers in these announcements are normally presented in
descending order of estimated value, so there is a natural
bias toward primacy effects. We also note that these
announcements are not widely read: the average number of
downloads in their sample is 5, while in our sample, mean
downloads is 195. For these reasons, the effect of list place-
ment on paper visibility remains an open question.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the
NBER working paper process. Section III describes our
data and empirical strategy. Section IV discusses models of
NBER readership behavior. Section V presents the results.
Section VI concludes.
II. The NBERWorking Paper Process
Each Monday morning (EST), the more than 23,000 sub-
scribers to the New This Week (NTW) e-mail receive that
week’s paper listings.2 Appendix B lists the format for a
typical week. Papers are listed in order of working paper
number.3 The top of the e-mail lists the paper titles and
links to a web page for that working paper (as shown in
appendix B), while the remainder of the e-mail provides
full abstracts and the web links for each paper. The link
leads directly to the web page specific to that working
paper, which includes the abstract and a link to a PDF of
the fulltext of the paper and other summary information.
While everyone can view the web page, free full-text PDF
downloads are restricted to individual and institutional sub-
scribers to the series, corporate associates, journalists, fed-
eral government employees and military personnel, and
residents of developing countries.4 The number of papers
per week varied from 7 to 45 during the 2013–2014 period,
with a mean of 20.3 and a median of 19.5.
The working paper process proceeds as follows. After a
paper is submitted to the NBER publications department,
the NBER staff check whether a number of criteria are met,
including that the paper has not been published elsewhere,
that the NBER’s disclosure policy has been read by all
authors and they have accordingly disclosed sources of
research funding and financial relationships that bear on
their research, and that the paper does not ‘‘make policy
recommendations or offer normative judgment about poli-
cies.’’ Once the staff member indicates in the database that
these checks have been completed, the paper is automati-
cally assigned the next available working paper number.
Papers are processed in batches between Tuesday and
Thursday each week, and working papers published by Fri-
day are then included in the e-mail announcement sent out
on the following Monday.
As a result of these checks, working papers are not neces-
sarily assigned numbers in the order in which they are sub-
mitted. In particular, delays between submission and num-
ber assignment have grown in recent years due to a more
rigorous disclosure policy. In addition, in some cases, the
announcement of a working paper is delayed to a subse-
quent week after a working paper number has been
assigned.5
Paper ranking is correlated with submission day and with
delays from submission. The former is due to the process
described above, while the latter is due to the fact that if
papers are delayed, they are placed earlier in the queue
when they are listed. But there is no evidence that either
submission date or delay is in any way chosen strategically
by either the NBER or authors. We have the advantage of
being able to talk directly with the NBER employee respon-
sible for creating the working paper list. She reports no
effort by the NBER to influence placement on the NTW list,
and she has never received a single author inquiry about the
ranking process or request for list placement.6
III. Data and Empirical Specification
For this project, we collected information on the rank of
papers in the NTW e-mail lists over the past three years.7
We match papers to three outcome variables.8 The first two
1 We review this order effects literature more extensively in the work-
ing paper version of this paper (Feenberg, Ganguli, Gaule´, & Gruber,
2015).
2 One restriction to our data is that only about half the subscribers to
NTW get the full list of papers, while the other half select the topics or
keywords for which they want notification (see http://www.nber.org
/prefs/notify). A paper may therefore be ranked higher on a selected list
than it is on the general list, but not lower. Unfortunately, we cannot
match our outcomes of interest to the rank on the selected list. But the
ability to create specialized lists should bias our results downward by
creating noise in the true ranking.
3 As of September 2015, the order of appearance was changed to be ran-
domized in each individual announcement.
4 Details available at http://www.nber.org/help/wp/free.html.
5 This occurs, for instance, when authors send a revised file after a num-
ber has been assigned but before the e-mail announcement is sent out. A
small number of working papers have excessive delays, of more than fifty
days, presumably due to issues such as the difficulty of obtaining author
permissions. We exclude these cases. Including these papers does not
weaken our results.
6 A handful of targeted decisions were made about which working
papers would receive particularly notable numbers (e.g., 15,000 or
20,000). But even in these cases, there was no effort to influence place-
ment in the NTW list.
7 For about 25 papers out of the 1,800 that we use for our downloads
and click-through results, they either did not appear in NTW or we do not
have information on where they placed. They are excluded from the ana-
lysis.
8 One restriction to our data is that only about half the subscribers to
NTW get the full list of papers; the other half select the topics or key-
words for which they want notification (see http://www.nber.org/prefs
/notify). A paper may therefore be ranked higher on a selected list than it
is on the general list, but not lower. The ability to create specialized lists
should bias our results downward by creating noise in the true ranking.
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are the number of clicks from the link in the NTW e-mail to
the paper’s web page (hits) and the number of downloads of
the PDF file. Data on these come from 2013 and 2014 only.
The third dependent variable is the number of citations to
the working paper and subsequent versions of the paper.
The citations counts were collected from Google Scholar
because other sources, such as Web of Science and Scopus,
do not index working papers. Google Scholar aggregates
citations across different versions of the same paper. We
use the set of working papers announced in 2012 and 2013
for the citations analysis, as we observe only relatively few
citations (yet) for papers listed in the 2014 NTW e-mails.
Using these data, we run ordinary least squares regres-
sions of the form9
ln VIEWitð Þ ¼ aþ b RANKit þ Xitdþ qt þ eit; ð1Þ
where i indexes papers and t indexes weeks; VIEW is some
measure of the attention paid to the paper, using the three
dimensions denoted above; RANK is one of several mea-
sures of the paper’s ranking in the NTW e-mail; X is a set
of paper-specific control variables; and r is a set of fixed
effects for each calendar week. This specification allows us
to ask, among all papers submitted in the same week, how
does the placement in the NTW e-mail influence the atten-
tion that is paid to that paper?
For controls, we include the number of authors on the
paper; log of the number of working paper publications
from the most (working paper) published coauthor on the
paper; the presence of a ‘‘star’’ coauthor, which is defined
as having an author with a previous NBER working paper
that was in the top 5% in terms of forward citations (relative
to other working papers published in the same year); the
number of NBER programs in which the paper is listed;10
and a set of dummies for each NBER program in which the
paper is listed. In order to control for any potential concerns
over endogenous placement, we also include seven daily
dummies for the day of the week on which the paper was
submitted (in case authors were trying to find the day of the
week that generated highest placement) and the number of
days delay (in case authors were hoping to use more delay
to generate higher placement).11
The means of our data are presented in table 1 for the
2013–2014 sample (except for citations, which come from
the 2012–2013 sample). Appendix table A1 shows that
there are no significant correlations between the rank mea-
sures and various proxies for the quality of the working
paper, such as having a highly cited author or the number of
programs listed. Day of submissions and the delay from
submission to announcement are correlated with rank mea-
sures. However, we show in the working paper version of
this paper (Feenberg et al., 2015) that day of submissions
and the delay are themselves not correlated with citations.
Feenberg et al. (2015) also includes a series of specification
checks, including evidence that our results on being ranked
first are robust to controlling for hits and downloads not ori-
ginating from the NTW e-mail, as well as to restricting the
sample to papers submitted on the same day as the paper
listed first and restricting to the first- and second-ranked
papers on the list.
IV. Models of NTW Readership
In this section, we discuss possible ways that list place-
ment could influence the choice of which papers readers
TABLE 1.—MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Abstract views (‘‘hits’’) 921.18 724.00
Paper downloads 195.40 645.01
Citationsa 13.58 27.34
Number of previous WPs (maximum) 18.31 19.21
Author count 2.51 1.01
Star author 0.049 0.216
Days of delay 11.97 5.06
Number of NBER programs 2.11 1.22
Submission day
Submitted Monday 0.19 0.39
Submitted Tuesday 0.20 0.40
Submitted Wednesday 0.18 0.38
Submitted Thursday 0.17 0.37
Submitted Friday 0.15 0.36
Submitted Saturday 0.06 0.24
Submitted Sunday 0.06 0.24
NBER program
Aging 0.06 0.24
Asset pricing 0.11 0.31
Corporate finance 0.10 0.30
Children 0.08 0.26
Development of the American economy 0.07 0.25
Development in Education 0.13 0.33
Environmental and Energy Economics 0.07 0.26
Economic Fluctuations and Growth 0.22 0.41
Health Care 0.07 0.26
Health Economics 0.11 0.31
International Finance and Macroeconomics 0.10 0.30
Industrial Organization 0.09 0.28
International Trade and Investment 0.07 0.25
Law and Economics 0.05 0.22
Labor Studies 0.22 0.41
Monetary Economics 0.11 0.31
Public Economics 0.21 0.41
Political Economy 0.07 0.26
Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship 0.09 0.29
Number of observations 2110
The sample is the set of working papers appearing in the New This Week e-mail bulletin from January
2013 to December 2014.
aFor citations, the figure is for papers in the New This Week e-mail bulletin from January 2012 to
December 2013.
9 As a robustness check, we ran Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood re-
gressions with similar results.
10 More information about the NBER research programs is available at
http://www.nber.org/programs/: ‘‘The research activities of the NBER are
organized into a series of twenty research programs and fifteen working
groups. . . . [which] correspond loosely to traditional fields of study within
the field of economics.’’ Each paper is assigned a program primarily
based on the affiliation of the authors (for those with an NBER affilia-
tion).
11 Yogatama et al. (2011) examine how text features of NBER working
papers can improve predictions about the number of downloads a paper
will receive. While they find that text features improve prediction, our pri-
mary interest is the effect rank variable, so we did not pursue including
text variables in our specifications.
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give their attention to. We note, however, that there need
not be one model for everyone: different readers may have
different approaches to reading the list, with total reader-
ship reflecting a population mix.
A first possibility is that NTW subscribers inspect the
titles (or abstracts) of all papers in the list and decide to
examine further the subset of papers where the expected
benefit of doing so exceeds a (constant) marginal cost. If
the order on the list is effectively random and subscribers
do not mistakenly infer quality from list placement, we
would then not observe order effects.
A second possibility is that readers’ behavior is satisfi-
cing. Here, readers are looking for 1 (or n) articles to select
from the list to view or read. They make this choice without
a full examination of available options and stop when they
reach the desired number of articles to view. If readers also
start from the beginning of the list and proceed down it, this
will generate order effects with a gradual decline in reader-
ship as the rank in list placement increases.
A third possibility is that readers are again selecting 1 (or
n) articles to view without examining all options, but the
marginal cost may be increasing as readers move down the
list. This could arise, for instance, from cognitive fatigue or
short-term memory congestion. If readers are evaluating
papers on the list with a confirmation bias (searching for
reasons to pay attention to a paper), this would lead to pri-
macy effects, while if they search for reasons to reject a
paper, this would lead to recency effects. This would also
generate a gradual decline (or gradual increase) in attention
with increasing rank.
Another possibility is that the marginal cost of reading
may be increasing not because of fatigue but because the
opportunity cost of reading in terms of time is increasing.
This could arise when a new activity—for instance, the arri-
val of a new e-mail or a colleague knocking on the door—
suddenly demands attention. If readers are faced with such
interruptions, we may observe skimming behavior, where
certain prominent positions on the list receive dispropor-
tionate attention relative to the remaining items. Prominent
positions would include the first, second, and possibly last
rank on the list.12
A related possibility is that interruptions lead to delay in
when readers view the paper. If there are serial position
effects in memory, readers will be more likely to return to
prominent positions in the list, and as Berger (2016) shows,
order biases are likely to be greater after delay.
Finally, we note that these models may predict different
behavior regarding the intensity of the attention given to a
paper, which represent different marginal costs to readers
(e.g., viewing an abstract is relatively cheap, but download-
ing and especially reading the whole paper is costly). This
may lead to stronger order effects for some of our outcomes
depending on the mechanism driving the behavior.13
IV. Results
The behavioral models discussed in the previous section
suggest that papers listed in prominent positions (first few
or last) may receive more attention or that there may be a
decline (or increase) in attention due to a fatigue factor if
order effects are present. To test for this, we estimate equa-
tion (1) with dummies for papers in rank 1, rank 2, or the
last position and a linear rank term.
Table 2 shows our basic results for hits, paper down-
loads, and citations.14 The most striking finding is a siz-
able positive effect of being ranked first across all out-
comes. Specifically, we find that being ranked first leads to
33% more hits, 30% more downloads, and 27% more cita-
tions (column 1). We also find positive coefficients for
being ranked second or last, though the magnitudes are
smaller, and the coefficients are significant only for last
rank on hits and downloads. The linear effect of rank is
negative and significant (column 4 and 5) for both hits and
downloads, though not for cites. In terms of goodness of
fit, specifications that have indicator variables for ranks 1,
2, and last, as well as a linear term for rank, have higher
adjusted R2.
As discussed in the preceding section, a model of satisfi-
cing behavior or increasing cognitive costs would predict a
gradual decline over the list. We find some evidence of such
a decline. However, our more salient finding is about the
effect of the first position, which is not readily explained by
existing theory models but is consistent with empirical evi-
dence from other settings, such as computer science eye-
tracking studies or studies documenting serial position
effects of memory.
To shed further light on the mechanisms at play, we
reproduce our main specification separately for different
subsamples (in table 3). We take as the main specification
the one with both linear rank and indicator variables for
first, second and last, since this specification has the high-
est adjusted R2 among the alternatives considered in table
2. First, we can assess whether the finding is due to a lack
of attention among nonexperts. To address this point, we
restrict the analysis solely to those who have the higher
education-based .edu extensions in their e-mail addresses.
This allows us to have a subset on a more expert set
of readers who should on average have more pro-
fessional interest in the working paper series. As shown in
12 Evidence from eye-tracking studies show that individuals usually
focus on the first two items on a list. See Granka, Joachims, and Gay
(2004) and http://googleblog.blogspot.cz/2009/02/eye-tracking-studies
-more-than-meets.html.
13 For example, Lorigo et al. (2008) and Granka et al. (2004) report
from eye-tracking studies that while participants viewed the first two item
abstracts on a list for equal time, they gave the first disproportionate atten-
tion thereafter.
14 We do not discuss the control variables here, but a discussion can be
found in Feenberg et al. (2015). That working paper also includes a num-
ber of tests to show the robustness of the findings, as well as further evi-
dence of randomization in list placement and that unobserved paper qual-
ity is not driving the results.
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column 2, the results for the .edu subscribers are only
slightly moderated relative to the baseline specification
(column 1).
Second, we check whether the rank effects are stronger
when lists are above median in length (more than 20 papers,
column 3) versus lists below median in length (column 4).
We find some evidence that inattention is driven by longer
lists. For instance, the effect of the first rank on hits and
cites is noticeably larger in the longer lists. This evidence is
compatible with the models, suggesting a gradual decline in
attention.
Third, we investigate whether limited attention is driven
by the attractiveness of the first options. We rate the
‘‘quality’’ of the first option on the NTW list by whether it
has a star author (as defined previously). While the sample
size is limited, we find some evidence that the second paper
receives fewer downloads and hits when the first paper is
by a star (columns 5 and 6). This evidence is compatible
with satisficing behavior, as perusing would be more likely
to stop if the first option is satisfactory.
Finally, we examine whether the rank effects are weaker
during periods when individuals are busier and thus more
likely to skim or face interruptions. We do observe smaller
point estimates for the effect of rank 1 in July and August,
when subscribers, especially academics with .edu e-mail
addresses, may be less busy (columns 7 and 8).
To summarize, we find large effects for the first paper
and somewhat smaller ones for the last paper for low-cost
attention activities (hits and downloads). We also find some
evidence of a fatigue factor. Moreover, the bias is greater
the longer the list, there is greater attention for star papers,
and rank effects are smaller during summer months.
In our view, these results may arise through a variety of
the mechanisms discussed in section II and are likely to
reflect different approaches to reading the list among sub-
scribers. For hits and downloads in particular, we suggest
that the results are most consistent with skimming, where
individuals focus on the first few papers in the list due to
time constraints or interruptions. This can then also lead to
the large disproportionate effect for rank 1 for citations,
TABLE 2.——BASIC RESULTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hits
Rank 1 0.328*** 0.350*** 0.337***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.067)
Rank 2 0.090 0.055
(0.063) (0.063)
Last rank 0.100** 0.089** 0.164***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.047)
Rank 0.010*** 0.012***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.226 0.238 0.232 0.247
Number of observations 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110
Number of weeks 104 104 104 104 104
Downloads
Rank 1 0.294*** 0.322*** 0.311***
(0.083) (0.088) (0.089)
Rank 2 0.120 0.088
(0.082) (0.083)
Last rank 0.168** 0.157* 0.226**
(0.079) (0.080) (0.081)
Rank 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.137 0.142 0.137 0.146
Number of observations 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110
Number of weeks 104 104 104 104 104
Cites
Rank 1 0.269** 0.289** 0.298**
(0.130) (0.134) (0.133)
Rank 2 0.083 0.106
(0.130) (0.129)
Last rank 0.102 0.092 0.049
(0.107) (0.107) (0.114)
Rank 0.007* 0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.097
Number of observations 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018
Number of weeks 104 104 104 104 104
The ‘‘hits’’ and ‘‘downloads’’ sections list working papers appearing in the New This Week e-mail bulletin from January 2013 to December 2014 and the ‘‘basic results’’ sections for papers appearing from January
2012 to December 2013. Estimation is by OLS, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are log(1 þ hits), log(1 þ views), and log(1 þ downloads, respectively). All regressions include
as control variables the number of coauthors, the number of NBER programs in which the paper is listed, the log of the number of previous working papers (maximum among the coauthors), the delay between sub-
mission to the NBER and announcement as well as day-of-xsubmission fixed effects, week fixed effects, and NBER program fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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particularly since reading (and citing) a paper represents a
high marginal cost activity. The large effect of rank 1 in
particular for citations would also be consistent with evi-
dence from eye-tracking studies and evidence of serial posi-
tion effects in memory, particularly after delay.
VI. Conclusion
The NBER New This Week e-mail list represents a cano-
nical example of choice from lists of the type that is preva-
lent in online search. We find that search from this list
shows strong primacy effects, whereby papers displayed
earlier on the list are viewed, downloaded, and cited more
often than are other papers, as well as some recency effects,
with the last paper also being more frequently viewed and
downloaded. We argue that this is independent of paper
quality and employ a variety of tests to demonstrate this
case.
Order effects can arise through a variety of mechanisms.
Some of our evidence can be interpreted as consistent with
models of satisficing behavior or cognitive fatigue. Our
results appear most consistent with skimming behavior,
where a few prominent positions on the list get dispropor-
tionate cognitive attention. Given that a similar empirical
pattern has also been found in other settings, formal model-
ing of why such skimming behavior may arise could be a
fruitful area of future inquiry. But an important limitation
of all work to date in list-based choices, including our own,
is a lack of clear discriminatory tests across these models.
To summarize, our findings suggest that presentation
order can be a powerful determinant of choice in a list-
based environment more generally and that this can have
strong downstream effects, such as through paper citations
in our sample. These results, and in particular the findings
for citations, have potentially important implications for the
economics profession. Citation counts are often thought to
be a good proxy for reputation and impact (Hamermesh
& Pfann, 2012). As such, they are increasingly used by edu-
cational units in evaluating candidates for promotion and
tenure, as well as to rank departments and individual
TABLE 3.——RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT SUBSAMPLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Users .edu Users Long List Short List Paper 1 ¼ Star Paper 1= Star Summer Not Summer
Hits
Rank 1 0.337*** 0.275*** 0.390*** 0.295*** 0.564 0.346*** 0.254* 0.372***
(0.067) (0.077) (0.101) (0.083) (0.292) (0.069) (0.123) (0.079)
Rank 2 0.055 0.084 0.097 0.038 0.350 0.072 0.144 0.047
(0.063) (0.067) (0.085) (0.099) (0.198) (0.065) (0.172) (0.067)
Last rank 0.164*** 0.189*** 0.161** 0.147** 0.036 0.174*** 0.033 0.182***
(0.047) (0.056) (0.062) (0.070) (0.305) (0.049) (0.132) (0.052)
Rank 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.011* 0.020 0.013*** 0.009* 0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.022) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.263 0.235 0.265 0.428 0.249 0.204 0.253
Number of observations 2,110 1,959 1,378 732 75 2,035 349 1,761
Weeks 97 97 56 48 5 99 17 87
Downloads
Rank 1 0.311*** 0.256*** 0.362*** 0.337*** 0.006 0.316*** 0.116 0.380***
(0.089) (0.086) (0.131) (0.117) (0.249) (0.092) (0.218) (0.103)
Rank 2 0.088 0.118 0.148 0.106 0.961* 0.100 0.186 0.097
(0.083) (0.076) (0.118) (0.138) (0.382) (0.085) (0.180) (0.092)
Last rank 0.226*** 0.224** 0.168* 0.265** 0.484 0.234*** 0.391 0.183**
(0.081) (0.100) (0.093) (0.125) (0.456) (0.084) (0.353) (0.075)
Rank 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009 0.047 0.011*** 0.013** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.071) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.198 0.137 0.182 0.155 0.153 0.103 0.153
Number of observations 2,110 1,959 1,378 732 75 2,035 349 1,761
Weeks 104 97 56 48 5 99 17 87
Cites
Rank 1 0.298** NA 0.396** 0.246 0.955 0.298** 0.224 0.288*
(0.133) (0.194) (0.197) (1.817) (0.138) (0.334) (0.148)
Rank 2 0.106 NA 0.039 0.256 0.079 0.109 0.309 0.051
(0.129) (0.204) (0.181) (0.485) (0.134) (0.335) (0.145)
Last rank 0.049 NA 0.145 0.087 0.828 0.067 0.018 0.068
(0.114) (0.164) (0.171) (0.480) (0.118) (0.212) (0.134)
Rank 0.007 NA 0.007 0.016 0.053 0.007 0.017 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.096) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.090 0.097 0.271 0.095 0.098 0.097
Number of observations 2,018 1,171 847 76 1,942 352 1,666
Weeks 104 47 57 5 99 18 86
The ‘‘hits’’ and ‘‘downloads’’ sections list working papers appearing in the New This Week e-mail bulletin from January 2013 to December 2014 and the ‘‘cites’’ sections from January 2012 to December 2013.
Estimation is by OLS, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are log(1 þ hits), log(1 þ downloads), and log(1 þ cites), respectively. All regressions include as control variables the
number of coauthors, the number of NBER programs in which the paper is listed, the log of the number of previous working papers (maximum among the coauthors), the delay between submission to the NBER and
announcement as well as day-of-submission fixed effects, week fixed effects, and NBER program fixed effects. Column 1 reproduces our main specification, the last column of table 2. Column 2 uses hits by .edu sub-
scribers and downloads by .edu subscribers as dependent variables. Column 3 and 4 restrict the sample to papers announced in the list above median length (20 papers) and below median length, respectively. Column
5 restricts the sample to lists where the first paper was by a star author. Column 7 restricts the samples to papers announced in July and August. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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researchers (Coupe´, 2003; Zimmermann, 2013). If these
counts can be affected by factors as minor as random place-
ment on a working paper list, it raises important questions
about their limitations and their discriminatory power
between higher- and lower-quality work. Fortunately, in the
wake of the findings reported in this paper, the NBER has
recently moved to a randomization process for the presenta-
tion of working papers in the NTW e-mail, which will at
least remove this potential source of bias toward evaluating
paper quality.
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(1) (2)
Rank 1
Linear
Rank
Previous working papers (maximum) 0.000 0.007
(0.000) (0.008)
Star author (top 5% cites) 0.008 0.050
(0.022) (0.604)
Number of authors 0.004 0.029
(0.004) (0.139)
Number of programs 0.008 0.373
(0.010) (0.288)
Delay (days) 0.022*** 0.901***
(0.001) (0.074)
Submission day (Sunday omitted)
Monday 0.026* 0.124
(0.015) (0.528)
Tuesday 0.026 2.649***
(0.016) (0.678)
Wednesday 0.047** 3.118***
(0.019) (0.557)
Thursday 0.041** 1.881***
(0.017) (0.606)
Friday 0.022 0.162
(0.017) (0.488)
Saturday 0.033* 0.243
(0.020) (0.572)
NBER program (Public Economics omitted)
Aging 0.005 1.286**
(0.019) (0.548)
Asset Pricing 0.017 0.161
(0.017) (0.410)
Children 0.037 0.559
(0.025) (0.566)
Corporate Finance 0.004 0.944**
(0.017) (0.412)
Development 0.032þ 0.476
(0.016) (0.427)
Development of the American Economy 0.013 0.209
(0.018) (0.536)
Education 0.037* 0.283
(0.021) (0.552)
Economic Fluctuations and Growth 0.001 0.502
(0.015) (0.430)
Environmental and Energy Economics 0.031 0.241
(0.019) (0.459)
Health Care 0.014 0.439
(0.020) (0.507)
Health Economics 0.014 0.655
(0.019) (0.588)
Industrial Organization 0.044** 0.251
(0.020) (0.545)
International Finance and Macroeconomics 0.014 0.689*
(0.014) (0.380)
International Trade and Investment 0.013 0.362
(0.013) (0.449)
Labor Studies 0.008 1.011***
(0.018) (0.371)
Law and Economics 0.013 0.365
(0.022) (0.561)
Monetary Economics 0.004 0.321
(0.018) (0.500)
Political Economy 0.016 0.210
(0.020) (0.481)
Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship 0.017 0.146
(0.018) (0.442)
Constant 0.188*** 23.990***
(0.021) (0.803)
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APPENDIX B
Sample NTW E-mail from February 9, 2015
THE LATEST WORKING PAPERS
National Bureau of Economic Research
February 9, 2015
The following NBER working papers that match your selections were
released in electronic format during the last week.
1. ‘‘The Maturity and Payment Schedule of Sovereign Debt,’’ by Yan
Bai, Seon Tae Kim, and Gabriel P. Mihalache, WP20896 (IFM) http
://papers.nber.org/papers/W20896?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium
=email&utm_source=ntw
2. ‘‘The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards and
Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia,’’ by Abhijit Banerjee, Rema
Hanna, Jordan C. Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto,
WP20923 (DEV PE POL), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20923
?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
3. ‘‘Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate
Assembly,’’ by Martin L. Weitzman, WP20925 (EEE), http://papers.nber
.org/papers/W20925?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm
_source=ntw.
4. ‘‘Disaster Risk and Its Implications for Asset Pricing,’’ by Jerry Tsai
and Jessica A. Wachter, WP20926 (AP EFG), http://papers.nber.org
/papers/W20926?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source
=ntw.
5. ‘‘Patient Responses to Incentives in Consumer-Directed Health Plans:
Evidence from Pharmaceuticals,’’ by Peter J. Huckfeldt, Amelia Havi-
land, Ateev Mehrotra, Zachary Wagner, and Neeraj Sood, WP20927
(HC HE), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20927?utm_campaign=ntw
&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
6. ‘‘Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective,’’
by Raj Chetty, WP20928 (AG LE LS PE), http://papers.nber.org
/papers/W20928?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source
=ntw.
7. ‘‘Childhood Medicaid Coverage and Later Life Health Care Utiliza-
tion’’ by Laura R. Wherry, Sarah Miller, Robert Kaestner, and Bruce
D. Meyer, WP20929 (CH HC HE PE), http://papers.nber.org/papers
/W20929?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
8. ‘‘State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise,’’ by Donghua Chen, Dequan
Jiang, Alexander Ljungqvist, Haitian Lu, and Mingming Zhou
WP20930 (CF LE), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20930?utm_cam
paign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
9. ‘‘Networks, Shocks, and Systemic Risk,’’ by Daron Acemoglu, Asu-
man Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, WP20931 (EFG), http
://papers.nber.org/papers/W20931?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium
=email&utm_source=ntw.
10. ‘‘Veterans’ Labor Force Participation: What Role Does the VA’s Dis-
ability Compensation Program Play?’’ by Courtney Coile, Mark Dug-
gan, and Audrey Guo WP20932 (AG HE LS PE), http://papers.nber
.org/papers/W20932?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm
_source=ntw.
11. ‘‘The International Transmission of Credit Bubbles: Theory and Pol-
icy,’’ by Jaume Ventura, and Alberto Martin, WP20933 (EFG),
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20933?utm_campaign=ntw&utm
_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
12. ‘‘The National Rise in Residential Segregation,’’ by Trevon Logan,
and John Parman WP20934 (DAE), http://papers.nber.org/papers
/W20934?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
13. ‘‘Premature Deindustrialization,’’ by Dani Rodrik, WP20935 (DEV
EFG ITI PR), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20935?utm_campaign
=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
14. ‘‘Collective Action: Experimental Evidence,’’ by Maria Victoria
Anauati, Sebastian Galiani, Gustavo Torrens, and Brian Feld,
WP20936 (DEV), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20936?utm_cam
paign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
15. ‘‘Racial Disparities in Savings Behavior for a Continuously
Employed Cohort,’’ by Kai Yuan Kuan, Mark R. Cullen, and Sepideh
Modrek WP20937 (AG PE), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20937
?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
16. ‘‘Age, Cohort and Co-Authorship,’’ by Daniel S. Hamermesh,
WP20938 (LS), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20938?utm_campaign
=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
17. ‘‘Measuring Job-Finding Rates and Matching Efficiency with Hetero-
geneous Jobseekers,’’ by Robert E. Hall, and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl,
WP20939 (EFG LS), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20939?utm_
campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
18. ‘‘The Impact of Intergroup Contact on Racial Attitudes and Revealed
Preferences’’ by Scott E. Carrell, Mark Hoekstra, and James E. West,
WP20940 (ED LS PE), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20940?utm
_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
19. ‘‘Is Sniping a Problem for Online Auction Markets?’’ by Matthew
Backus, Tom Blake, Dimitriy V. Masterov, and Steven Tadelis,
WP20942 (IO), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20942?utm_campaign
=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
20. ‘‘The Internationalization of the RMB, Capital Market Openness, and
Financial Reforms in China,’’ by Joshua Aizenman, WP20943 (IFM),
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20943?utm_campaign=ntw&utm
_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
21. ‘‘The Impact of War on Resource Allocation: ‘Creative Destruction’
and the American Civil War,’’ by B. Zorina Khan, WP20944 (DAE
POL PR), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W20944?utm_campaign=ntw
&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
22. ‘‘‘To Have and Have Not’: Are Rich Litigious Plaintiffs Favored in
Court?’’ by B. Zorina Khan, WP20945 (DAE DEV LE POL), http
://papers.nber.org/papers/W20945?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium
=email&utm_source=ntw.
23. ‘‘Facilitating Savings for Agriculture: Field Experimental Evidence
from Malawi,’’ by Lasse Brune, Xavier Gine, Jessica Goldberg,
and Dean Yang, WP20946 (DEV), http://papers.nber.org/papers
/W20946?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
24. ‘‘Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage Applications during
the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005,’’ by Atif R. Mian, and Amir
Sufi, WP20947 (AP CF EFG ME), http://papers.nber.org/papers
/W20947?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw.
APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
(1) (2)
Rank 1
Linear
Rank
Number of observations 2,110 2,110
Number of weeks 104 104
Regressions include working papers appearing in the New This Week e-mail bulletin from January
2013 to December 2014. Estimation is by OLS, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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